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Abstract
CycleGAN [Zhu et al., 2017] is one recent successful approach to learn a transfor-
mation between two image distributions. In a series of experiments, we demon-
strate an intriguing property of the model: CycleGAN learns to “hide” information
about a source image into the images it generates in a nearly imperceptible, high-
frequency signal. This trick ensures that the generator can recover the original
sample and thus satisfy the cyclic consistency requirement, while the generated
image remains realistic. We connect this phenomenon with adversarial attacks
by viewing CycleGAN’s training procedure as training a generator of adversarial
examples and demonstrate that the cyclic consistency loss causes CycleGAN to be
especially vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
1 Introduction
Image-to-image translation is the task of taking an image from one class of images and rendering it
in the style of another class. One famous example is artistic style transfer, pioneered by Gatys et al.
[2015], which is the task of rendering a photograph in the style of a famous painter.
One recent technique for image-to-image translation is CycleGAN [Zhu et al., 2017]. It is particularly
powerful because it requires only unpaired examples from two image domains X and Y . CycleGAN
works by training two transformations F : X → Y and G : Y → X in parallel, with the goal of
satisfying the following two conditions:
1. Fx ∼ p(y) for x ∼ p(x), and Gy ∼ p(x) for y ∼ p(y);
2. GFx = x for all x ∈ X , and FGy = y for all y ∈ Y ,
where p(x) and p(y) describe the distributions of two domains of imagesX and Y . The first condition
ensures that the generated images appear to come from the desired domains and is enforced by training
two discriminators on X and Y respectively. The second condition ensures that the information about
a source image is encoded in the generated image and is enforced by a cyclic consistency loss of
the form ||GFx− x||+ ||FGy − y||. The hope is that the information about the source image x is
encoded semantically into elements of the generated image Fx.
For our experiments, we trained a CycleGAN model on a “maps” dataset consisting of approximately
1,000 aerial photographs X and 1,000 maps Y . The model trained for 500 epochs produced two
maps F : X → Y and G : Y → X that generated realistic samples from these image domains.
2 Hidden Information
We begin with a curious observation, illustrated in Figure 1. We first take an aerial photograph x that
was unseen by the network at training time. Since the network was trained to minimize the cyclic
consistency loss, one would expect that x ≈ GFx, and indeed the two images turn out to be nearly
identical. However, upon closer inspection, it becomes apparent that there are many details present
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(a) Aerial photograph: x. (b) Generated map: Fx. (c) Aerial reconstruction: GFx.
Figure 1: Details in x are reconstructed in GFx, despite not appearing in the intermediate map Fx.
(a) Generated map. (b) Training map, for comparison.
Figure 2: Maps with details amplified by adaptive histogram equalization. Information is present in
the generated map even in regions that appear empty to the naked eye.
in both the original aerial photograph x and the aerial reconstruction GFx that are not visible in
the intermediate map Fx. For example, the pattern of black dots on the white roof in x is perfectly
reconstructed, even though in the map, that area appears solidly gray. How does the network know
how to reconstruct the dots so precisely? We observe this phenomenon with nearly every aerial
photograph passed into the network, as well as when CycleGAN is trained on datasets other than
maps.
We claim that CycleGAN is learning an encoding scheme in which it “hides” information about the
aerial photograph x within the generated map Fx. This strategy is not as surprising as it seems at first
glance, since it is impossible for a CycleGAN model to learn a perfect one-to-one correspondence
between aerial photographs and maps, when a single map can correspond to a vast number of aerial
photos, differing for example in rooftop color or tree location.
It may be possible to directly see where CycleGAN may be encoding this hidden information. When
we zoom into an apparently solid region of the generated map, we in fact find a surprising amount of
variation. We amplify this variation using an image processing technique called adaptive histogram
equalization, which enhances contrast in a local neighborhood of each pixel, and present the results
in Figure 2. For comparison, we apply the same transformation to a ground truth training map. We
see that there does appear to be an extra, high-frequency signal in the generated map. We investigate
the nature of this encoding scheme in the following sections.
3 Sensitivity to Corruption
In this section, we corrupt the generated map with noise and study how the aerial reconstruction
changes, in order to characterize the nature of the encoding scheme. Specifically, let us define
V ≡ Ex∼p(x),z∼p(z)||G(Fx+ z)−GFx||1, (1)
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(a) V at σ = 0 (spatially independent noise).
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
σ
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
V
(b) V at  = 0.01.
Figure 3: Sensitivity of G to noise as the amplitude  and spatial correlation σ of the noise varies. In
(a), V =  is plotted for reference.
(a) Original image: x. (b) Edited image: x′. (c) Generated map: Fx′. (d) Difference: Fx′−Fx.
Figure 4: The information encoding is surprisingly non-local.
where p(x) is the true aerial image distribution and p(z) is a noise distribution. V measures how
different the aerial reconstruction is when noise is added, and we are interested in how V depends on
the noise distribution p(z). In our experiments, we chose p(z) to be Gaussian noise and varied the
standard deviation  and spatial correlation σ.
Figure 3 depicts how V behaves as a function of  and σ, where the expectation is approximated by
averaging over 50 aerial photographs. We found that V attains nearly its maximum value as soon as
 ≥ 3/256 ≈ 0.01, which corresponds to only 3 levels when the image is quantized by 8-bit integers.
Thus an imperceptible modification of the map image can lead to major changes in the reconstructed
aerial photograph. In fact, we found that simply encoding the generated map Fx with lossy JPEG
compression destroyed the reconstruction. We also found that V quickly decays to its minimum value
as soon as σ ≥ 2, indicating that the information is fairly robust to low-frequency content – including
what we perceive as the map itself. This suggests that the majority of information about the source
photograph is stored in a high-frequency, low-amplitude signal within the generated map.
While G is quite sensitive to noise added to a map Fx, we show that G is well-behaved when a
perturbation ∆ created by F is added to Fx. Towards this end, we manually create two aerial images
x′ and x′′ by editing a tree onto a grass field in x in two different locations; we then study the
differences in the generated map ∆′ = Fx′ − Fx and ∆′′ = Fx′′ − Fx, depicted in Figure 4.1 We
find that the reconstruction G(Fx+ ∆′ + ∆′′) contains both trees added in x′ and x′′ and does not
contain any unexpected artifacts. This may indicate that the encodings ∆′ and ∆′′ are small enough
that they operate in the linear regime of G, where
G(Fx+ ∆′ + ∆′′) = GFx+ dG∆′ + dG∆′′ +O(∆2), (2)
so that addition of perturbations in the map corresponds to independent addition of features in
the generated aerial image. We confirmed numerically that G(Fx + ε∆′) and G(Fx + ε∆′′) are
approximately linear with respect to ε. Finally, we note that if ∆′ is added to an entirely different
1Interestingly, the change ∆′ is not localized around the added tree but extends far beyond this region.
However, the tree is still reconstructed when we mask out the nonlocal pixels.
3
(a) Source map: y0. (b) Crafted map: y∗. (c) Difference: y∗ − y0. (d) Reconstruction: Gy∗.
Figure 5: Generation of a single target aerial photo x∗ from two arbitrary maps y0. Note that (c) is
amplified for visibility.
image, the generated aerial image does not necessarily reconstruct a tree and sometimes contains
artifacts.
4 Information Hiding as an Adversarial Attack
In this section, we demonstrate that G has the ability to reconstruct any desired aerial photograph x∗
from a specially crafted map y∗. Specifically, we solve the optimization problem
y∗ = arg min
y
||Gy − x∗||, (3)
by starting gradient descent from an initial, source map y0. This is in the same spirit as an adversarial
attack [Szegedy et al., 2013] on G, where we are constructing an input y that forces G to produce
a desired photograph x∗. We present the results in Figure 5; we find that the addition of a low-
amplitude signal to virtually any initial map y0 is sufficient to produce a given aerial image, and the
specially crafted map y∗ is visually indistinguishable from the original map y0. The fact that the
required perturbation is so small is not too surprising in light of Section 3, where we showed that tiny
perturbations in G’s input result in large changes in its output.
Recognizing that the cyclic consistency loss
arg min
F,G
||GFx− x||
is similar in form to the adversarial attack objective in Equation 3, we may view the CycleGAN
training procedure as continually mounting an adversarial attack on G, by optimizing a generator F
to generate adversarial maps that force G to produce a desired image. Since we have demonstrated
that it is possible to generate these adversarial maps using gradient descent, it is nearly certain that the
training procedure is also causing F to generate these adversarial maps. As G is also being optimized,
however, G may actually be seen as cooperating in this attack by learning to become increasingly
susceptible to attacks. We observe that the magnitude of the difference y∗ − y0 necessary to generate
a convincing adversarial example by Equation 3 decreases as the CycleGAN model trains, indicating
cooperation of G to support adversarial maps.
5 Discussion
CycleGAN is designed to find a correspondence between two probability distributions on domains
X and Y . However, if X and Y are of different complexity – if their distributions have differing
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entropy – it may be impossible to learn a one-to-one transformation between them. We demonstrated
that CycleGAN sidesteps this asymmetry by hiding information about the input photograph in a
low-amplitude, high-frequency signal added to the output image.
By encoding information in this way, CycleGAN becomes especially vulnerable to adversarial attacks;
an attacker can cause one of the learned transformations to produce an image of their choosing by
perturbing any chosen source image. The ease with which adversarial examples may be generated
for CycleGAN is in contrast to previous work by Tabacof et al. [2016] and Kos et al. [2017], which
illustrate that the same attack on VAEs requires noticeable changes to the input image. In serious
applications, the cyclic consistency loss should be modified to prevent such attacks. In a future
work, we will explore one possible defense: since this particular vulnerability is caused by the cyclic
consistency loss and the difference in entropy between the two domains, we investigate the possibility
of artificially increasing the entropy of one of the domains by adding an additional hidden variable.
For instance, if a fourth image channel is added to the map, information need not be hidden in
the image but may instead be stored in this fourth channel, thus reducing the need for the learned
transformations to amplify their inputs and making the possibility of attack less likely.
The phenomenon also suggests one possible route for improving the quality of images generated by
CycleGAN. Even though the cyclic consistency loss is intended to force the network into encoding
information about a source image semantically into the generated image, the model in practice learns
to “cheat” by encoding information imperceptibly, adversarially. If the network were somehow
prevented from hiding information, the transformations may be forced to learn correspondences that
are more semantically meaningful.
More broadly, the presence of this phenomenon indicates that caution is necessary when designing
loss functions that involve compositions of neural networks: such models may behave in unintuitive
ways if one component takes advantage of the ability of the other component to support adversarial
examples. Common frameworks such as generative adversarial networks (Goodfellow et al. [2014a])
and perceptual losses (e.g. Johnson et al. [2016]) employ these compositions; these frameworks
should be carefully analyzed to make sure that adversarial examples are not an issue.
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